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INTRODUCTION
  In 2013, the Russian Federation amended Federal Law No. 436-FZ, “On
Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and
Development” (2013 law), introducing language making illegal the public
discussion—or, in the law’s words, “propagandization”—of what it called
“non-traditional sexual relationships.”1 Undertaken during a period of in-
creasing domestic and international hostility, the law was intended by the
government to be a bold, two-fold rejection of supposedly “European”
values: first, as resistance to the gay rights movement, which is presented
as unsuitable for Russia; and second, as a means of further weakening the
freedom of expression in Russia. On both accounts, the 2013 law defies the
European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) as interpreted by
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (the ECtHR or the
Court).
As prosecutions under the 2013 law make their way through the Rus-
sian court system, a direct confrontation of authority between the Consti-
tutional Court of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg (the CCRF or
the Constitutional Court) and the ECtHR seems inevitable. Perhaps rec-
ognizing this, the ECtHR has issued a series of rulings over the last several
years that have placed it squarely in opposition with the direction of the
Russian government in a variety of high-profile cases. In addition to ac-
cepting cases concerning Russia’s prohibition on the public discussion of
homosexual relationships, analyzed in this note, the ECtHR has recently
ruled against Russia concerning the sensitive Yukos affair2 and on the
treatment of those detained in protest of Vladimir Putin’s return to the
presidency.3 Given the inevitability of a large conflict, the ECtHR should
move forward deliberately and rule the 2013 law to be a violation of the
ECHR.
In contrast to other disputes between Russia and the ECtHR, the 2013
law seems designed to highlight the question of who, the ECtHR or the
CCRF, has the final say on defining the meaning and scope of human
rights in Russia. The 2013 law represents a special case through which the
relationship between the ECHR and Russian Constitution can be ana-
lyzed. Four major factors, considered together, illustrate why this case is
particularly relevant. First, the nature of the 2013 law is an obvious affront
not only to domestic human rights protections but also, in the context of
1. Federal’nyi Zakon RF o vnecenii izmenenii v stat’yu 5 Federal’nogo zakona “O
zashchite detei ot informatsii, prichinyayushchei vred ikh zdorov’yu i razvitiyu” [Federal Law
of the Russian Federation on the Amendment of Statute 5 of the Federal Law “On the pro-
tection of children from information harmful to their health and development”], ROSSIIS-
KAYA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] July 2, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2013/06/30/deti-site-dok.html.
2. A final judgment required the Russian Federation to provide compensation to the
former shareholders of the Yukos oil corporation in the amount of nearly two billion Euros.
OAO Neftyanaya Kompania Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), http:/
/hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145730.
3. Frumkin v. Russia, App. No. 74568/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159762.
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recent rulings of the CCRF, a deliberate challenge to the Russian constitu-
tion’s unusual openness to international human rights law. Second, the
ECtHR has marked out an unmistakable path of protecting the freedom
of assembly from limitation due to discrimination against LGBT Europe-
ans.4 Third, unlike some of the other cases arriving before the ECtHR, the
Russian LGBT community has even less of a natural constituency to de-
fend it, meaning that help will likely need to come from outside of Russia.
Finally, if the ECtHR leaves unanswered Russia’s increasingly hostile re-
jection of its rulings, Russia may encourage other members of the ECHR
to openly defy the Court. In this context, while the 2013 law might at first
seem like just another Russian violation of the treaty, the pattern of resis-
tance takes on more significance as an open challenge to the binding—and
possibly constitutional—legal order of the ECHR.
The ECtHR’s response to this open challenge depends on whether the
web of interdependence between national and ECHR legal systems is suf-
ficiently strong to give the Court leverage over the situation. I argue that
the systems are indeed sufficiently interwoven to give the ECtHR the abil-
ity to bring significant force to its holdings, and that systems pluralism can
help describe that interdependence. A systems pluralism description of the
Russia-ECHR relationship explains why states do not simply ignore the
ECtHR when it suits them, even though the Court cannot directly enforce
its rulings. With this interdependence in mind, the ECtHR can demon-
strate that its rulings are more than suggestions by presenting Russia with
a choice: to protect LGBT Russians on the one hand, or risk the conse-
quences of total or partial withdrawal from an important European institu-
tion on the other. By making a firm statement, the Court can fortify the
binding effect of its rulings and send a message across Europe about the
continued vitality of the ECHR. Ultimately, while the ECtHR cannot
force Russia to live up to its responsibilities under international law, it can
bring serious costs to bear for the violation of those responsibilities by
simply continuing to assert that states cannot limit ECHR rights on the
basis of gender identity.
I. THE ECHR AND RUSSIA
  From the beginning, the ECtHR has pursued a step-by-step develop-
ment of its authority, slowly increasing its binding power and its ability to
influence member states. In some ways, however, Russia is the clearest
example of a general problem with determining the scope of the ECHR’s
purpose: is the ECHR really equipped to help lift post-communist states
4. For the purposes of this paper, the term “LGBT” is intended to be inclusive of the
wide spectrum of sexual orientations and gender identities subject to discriminatory govern-
ment policies, particularly as they have been treated by the ECtHR. See FRÉDÉRIC EDEL,
CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS RELATING TO DISCRIMINATION ON
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into governance that respects the rule of law and human rights? It should
not be surprising that Russia’s relationship with the Court has been at
times extremely difficult, but Russia has until recently trended toward in-
creasing integration. Given the challenge presented by Russia’s 2013 law
and the legal context in which the case comes to the ECtHR, the more
pressing question is whether the Court is ready to do what needs to be
done in relation to Russia.
Proposed on the heels of the passage of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ECHR was conceived of as “a type of collective pact
against totalitarianism” and perhaps as a means of European integration.5
Immediately after the ECHR treaty was concluded, however, many con-
sidered it “a major disappointment” due perhaps to the lack of a court
able to declare binding interpretation of the treaty’s lofty, sometimes im-
precise language.6 Since then, the ECHR has developed slowly, first by
adding the ECtHR in 1959, and then by developing the Court’s authority
to interpret the treaty. After the end of the Cold War, the Court’s devel-
opment proceeded more quickly as its workload was expanded to meet the
needs of new member states. Roadblocks to applying its jurisdiction were
removed in 1999, pilot judgments were introduced in the 2000s, and the
structure of the Court was reformed through Protocol 14 in 2010. Today,
the ECtHR enjoys a great deal of authority, even as it attempts to cope
with a case backlog currently standing at hundreds of thousands.
At its core, the controversy over the role of the ECHR may stem from
the higher risk—and perceived futility—associated with international
human rights documents that state a lofty ideal which signatories do not
reach. Hypothetically, the entire purpose of a regional human rights docu-
ment is to enjoin deep rather than broad commitment. Others might argue
that a broad commitment makes use of the attractiveness of European
institutions, not only increasing the spread of human rights but also im-
proving the security situation in Europe as a whole through increased Eu-
ropean integration. The ECHR has essentially attempted to pursue both
broad and deep commitment from the beginning, which is why it has con-
tinued to work with what is probably its most problematic member:
Russia.
A. Russian Resistance to the ECHR System as a Test Case
for Binding Authority
  Given the variety of states consistently found in violation of the ECHR
by the Court, the first question is why this case—and this country—should
be the center of a discussion about the binding power of the ECHR. First,
the case of LGBT expression in Russia provides a particularly clear exam-
ple of a collision between a member state’s interpretation of rights and the
5. Ed Bates, The Birth of the European Convention on Human Rights, in THE EURO-
PEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 41 (Jonas Christofferson &
Mikael Rask Madsen eds., 2011).
6. Id. at 29.
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ECtHR’s position. Unlike some challenges to the ECHR, the Russian gov-
ernment has always framed the 2013 law as a deliberate challenge to the
binding power of the Court and to supposedly foreign “European” values.
Second, the case falls squarely within a jurisprudence that is technically
undecided but practically inevitable—in contrast to issues less settled at
the ECtHR, such as gay marriage. Finally, and importantly, the CCRF has
continued to couch its resistance to the Court in terms of legal argumenta-
tion. This means that the conflict between Russia and the ECtHR can play
out at least partially on the legal plane instead of purely on the level of
politics.
At the same time, because resistance to the ECtHR is ultimately a
policy choice, Russia’s political influence on other states matters. While
other states, for example Turkey, Romania, and Hungary, continue to
struggle against applying the Court’s opinions, none have the same likeli-
hood as Russia in succeeding in a campaign of resistance, thanks to Rus-
sia’s unique standing in the international legal system: As an important
geopolitical center, as an economic force to be reckoned with, and as a
member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia’s treatment of in-
ternational law matters a great deal. Therefore, Russia’s interaction with
the ECHR may determine the range possibilities available to other mem-
ber states. If even Russia is in practice bound by the ECtHR’s rulings, all
member states are. However, if Russia is not bound, the question remains
whether other member states can also safely shirk their duties under the
treaty with similar impunity.
B. A History of Russian Resistance to the ECHR
  Russia joined the Council of Europe in 1996, but it has never achieved
full integration into the ECHR system. Even at the time of Russia’s admis-
sion, the Council of Europe looked past an unfavorable Eminent Lawyers
report from 1994 that strongly suggested that Russia was unprepared to
meet ECHR obligations,7 and despite efforts in that direction, Russia has
unevenly applied ECtHR rulings in its legal system.8 For example, even
though the Russian courts continue to maintain a long-standing morato-
rium on the death penalty,9 Russia is unable to ratify ECHR Protocols 6
or 13 until it formally outlaws the practice. The Russian Constitution al-
lows the death penalty under narrow circumstances, at least “until its abo-
7. “In sum, the experts have. . . come to the conclusion that the legal order of the
Russian Federation does not, at the present moment, meet the Council of Europe standards
as enshrined in the Statute of the Council and developed by the organs of the European
Convention on Human Rights.” Rudolf Bernhardt et al., “Report on the Conformity of the
Legal Order of the Russian Federation with Council of Europe Standards.” HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW JOURNAL 15:7, 287 (1994).
8. “To date [2006], the impact of the Convention on the Russian legal system in terms
of its implementation by domestic courts is unsatisfactory. There is a manifest and visible
imbalance between the normative provisions and the jurisprudence.” ANTON BURKOV, THE
IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON RUSSIAN LAW 83 (2007).
9. Russia won’t overturn death penalty ban–Chairman of Human Rights Council,
RAPSI (Jan. 30, 2015), http://rapsinews.com/legislation_news/20150130/273068258.html.
196 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:191
lition,”10 but proposals to return to the death penalty remain popular.11
Another particularly painful example lies in Russia’s refusal to ratify up-
dates to the ECtHR in Protocol 14 until 2010, four years later than any
other member of the Council of Europe, stymieing reform of the ECtHR
and blocking EU entry into the treaty organization for years.12 Further-
more, Russia frequently fails to implement the Court’s rulings: it has over
1,000 insufficiently-resolved cases under enhanced supervision by the
Committee of Ministers.13
As we shall see, domestic institutional resistance to the ECHR system
has also been strong, particularly from the CCRF. Constitutional courts
and international courts frequently have deep disagreements about the na-
ture and effect of international court rulings, so the CCRF’s discomfort
with the ECtHR supremacy should not be surprising. However, the
Court’s recent ruling in Markin v. Russia14 represents a landmark in the
deterioration of the relationship between the CCRF and the ECtHR and
helps set the stage for the increasingly difficult relationship between the
two courts. In the Markin case, Russian courts rejected the applicant’s
claims as a single parent of young children to a right to three years of
family leave from work as an army radio operator. The Russian courts
based their decision on two factors: first, that such family leave is granted
by law only to women; and second, that the government had a right to
discriminate based on gender in order to pursue the vital government goal
of maintaining discipline within the armed forces.15
10. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20,
translated in WILLIAM BURNHAM, PETER MAGGS & GENNADY M. DANILENKO, Law and
Legal System of the Russian Federation 652 (5th ed. 2012).
11. In 2013, one poll indicated a majority of Russians were in favor of reinstating the
death penalty. LEVADA TSENTR, BORBA S PRESTUPNOST’YU I SMERTNAYA KAZN’ [LEVADA
POLLING CTR., THE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME AND THE DEATH PENALTY] (June 28, 2013),
http://www.levada.ru/28-06-2013/borba-s-prestupnostyu-i-smertnaya-kazn. See also Bolye
poloviny Rossiyan za vozvrashenie smertnoi kazni [More than half of Russians in favor of the
return of the death penalty], IZVESTIA (July 1, 2013), http://izvestia.ru/news/552802.
12. Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 194, Protocol No. 14 to the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control
system of the Convention, Council of Europe Treaty Office, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=194&CM=2&DF=19/02/2010&CL=ENG (last visited Nov. 29,
2015). Although the CJEU has recently declined once again to approve accession to the
ECHR under current conditions, Russia’s resistance to Protocol 14 could also be seen as an
attempt to complicate the European Union’s requirement to accede to the ECHR in order to
meet the requirements of the Lisbon Treaty.
13. Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Pending cases:
current state of execution, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COE.int, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitor
ing/execution/reports/pendingcases_EN.asp?CaseTitleOrNumber=&StateCode=RUS&Sec
tionCode=ENHANCED+SUPERVISION (last visited Nov. 29, 2015) (listing that as of No-
vember 29, 2015, Russia had 1,062 cases in enhanced supervision.).
14. Markin v. Russia, App. No. 30078/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109868.
15. Id. ¶¶ 33-34.
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The ECtHR rejected Russia’s argument in a sixteen-to-one vote and
ruled that Article 14 of the ECHR prohibits discrimination where “other
persons in an analogous or relatively similar situation enjoy preferential
treatment,” applying its longstanding standard that “treatment is discrimi-
natory if it has no objective and reasonable justification.”16 Because
“equivalent posts in the applicant’s unit were often held by ser-
vicewomen,” who were provided three years of parental leave, and be-
cause the applicant was denied similar leave only because he was a man,
“he was therefore subjected to discrimination on the grounds of sex” with-
out sufficient justification.17
Dissatisfied by the Court’s conclusion, the military court appealed the
ECtHR ruling to the CCRF. In its decision issued on December 6, 2013,
the Constitutional Court ruled that lower courts are in fact bound by the
rulings of the ECtHR, and that any concerns about the constitutionality of
a ruling must be referred to the CCRF.18 The Constitutional Court noted
that the ECHR and the Russian Constitution share the same fundamental
values and therefore a similar competence. But because the Russian Con-
stitution is supreme over the treaty regime, the CCRF also strongly im-
plied that it retains the authority to interpret human rights provisions in
the constitution in contradiction of an ECtHR ruling as it sees fit. Because
the Constitutional Court did not go on to clarify entirely whether it can
override the ECtHR’s interpretation of rights—and if so, by what crite-
ria—the ruling avoided a clear statement as to how to resolve the discord
in relations between Russia and the ECtHR.19
On its own, the Markin CCRF decision represents more a shift in tone
than it does a major shift in policy. However, in context, the ruling seems
to be a harbinger of an open challenge. When the 2013 law was first
passed, shortly before the Markin CCRF decision, it was still unclear what
effect it would have, and whether the government would go further to
restrict expression. Over the tumultuous course of 2014, however, Russia’s
rights record continued to deteriorate even as its relationship with interna-
tional law worsened due to the events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
The CCRF has continued to express its opinion that it is not bound by
16. Id. ¶ 125.
17. Id. ¶ 149.
18. See Postanovlenie Konstitutsionogo Suda RF ot 6 dekabrya 2013 g. N 27-P [Ruling
of the Constitutional Court RF of 6 Dec. 2015 N 27-P], ROS. GAZ., Dec. 8, 2013, http://
www.rg.ru/2013/12/18/ks-dok.html [hereinafter Markin CCRF decision].  See generally
Novosti: 6 dekabrya 2013 goda Konstitutsionnii sud RF provozglasil Postanovlenie po delu o
proverke konstitutsionnosti punktov 3 i 4 chasti chetvertoi stat’i 392 Grazhdanskogo protses-
sual’nogo kodeksa RF [News: 6 December 2013 the Constitutional Court of the RF announced
a Ruling in the case of the constitutionality of points 3 and 4 of the fourth part of statute 392 of
the Citizen’s procedural codex of the RF] (executive summary), KONSTITUTSIONNII SUD ROS-
SIISKAIA FEDERATSIA (KONST. SUD RF), KSRF.ru (May 3, 2014), http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/
News/Pages/ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=3137.
19. Ekaterina Mishina, A Rubik’s Cube from Russia’s Constitutional Court, INSTITUTE
FOR MODERN RUSSIA (May 6, 2014), http://imrussia.org/en/rule-of-law/633-a-rubiks-cube-
from-russias-constitutional-court.
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ECtHR rulings.20 Now that several defendants convicted under the 2013
law have exhausted their domestic remedies, and have therefore become
eligible to appeal their cases to Strasbourg, this law represents just the first
wave of many potential cases which will come before the ECtHR in which
the Russian government will contend that ECtHR rulings do not apply to
it. What makes convictions under the 2013 law unusual is how blatantly
they violate the Court’s legal precedent.
In this context, it should be clear that the 2013 law is a direct confron-
tation of the ECtHR’s meaningful work to protect LGBT Europeans
through the application of ECHR Articles 14 (non-discrimination) and 11
(freedom of assembly). The Court’s reasoning in Article 11 cases—partic-
ularly in Alekseyev v. Russia (hereinafter Alekseyev I)21 regarding gay
pride parades in Moscow—does not allow states to wiggle out of providing
basic assembly rights to their LGBT citizens by claiming any exception
“necessary in a democratic society.”22 The 2013 law does not directly af-
fect assembly rights, but it reasserts the same public morals arguments as
do the governments in Ba̧czkowski v. Poland and Alekseyev I.23 Although
these concerns for public morals serve as the central legal justification for
the law (given the weakness of the propaganda argumentation), the 2013
law makes no attempt at addressing the ECtHR’s emphatic statements24
that fears for public safety are not sufficient to justify suppression of rights
on grounds of gender identity issues.
II. THE 2013 LAW PROHIBITING PROPAGANDA PROMOTING
NON-TRADITIONAL SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS
  Over the course of recent years, Russian authorities have passed mea-
sures to the effect of slowly stifling the ability of Russians to communicate
dissent, from the introduction of heightened legal reporting duties for indi-
vidual bloggers, to indirect controls exercised on media outlets, to the re-
cent imposition of onerous requirements on Internet search providers
regarding the Russian version of the right to be forgotten.25 In some ways,
20. See, e.g., Postanovlenie Konstitutsionogo Suda RF ot 14 iiulya 2015 g. N 21-P [Rul-
ing of the Constitutional Court RF of 14 July 2015 N. 21-P], YOS. GAZ.] ¶ 5.3, July 27, 2015,
http://www.rg.ru/2015/07/27/ks-dok.html (reasserting that the Constitution and the ECHR
are based in the same principles of human rights but that if the ECtHR interprets the ECHR
in such a way as to conflict with the Constitution, the ruling “cannot be carried out
[ ]”).
21. Alekseyev v. Russia, App. Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2011) [hereinafter Alekseyev I], http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-101257.
22. Id. ¶ 69.
23. Ba̧czkowski v. Poland, App. No. 1543/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 56-57, 86-89, (2007),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-80464; Alekseyev I, ¶¶ 56-63.
24. Alekseyev I, ¶¶ 66-69 (finding a breach of Article 11 right to assembly and sug-
gesting, but not confirming, an inappropriate application of proportionality in balancing
rights according to the “democratic necessity” requirement); id. ¶¶ 93-97, 100-01 (finding a
violation of Article 14, discrimination).
25. This requirement in particular could pose serious problems to the basic functioning
of the Internet by requiring Internet providers to delete links to any personal information a
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this process began in 2013 with the law proscribing public discussion of so-
called “non-traditional sexual relationships.” Targeting both individuals
and media organizations, the law imposes a fine for public discussion on
homosexual relationships, calling such speech “propaganda” that is harm-
ful to minors. In form, the law parodies international standards for the
suspension of the freedom of expression: by declaring the public discus-
sion of “nontraditional sexual relationships” deleterious to the health of
Russian youth, the law gestures at legitimate government ends (protection
of health and public morals) that might allow the suspension of certain
rights under international law—for example, under Article 10 of the
ECHR.26 In practice, however, the Russian government is on notice that
the legal theory of the restriction’s necessity due to a threat to “health or
morals” is strongly out of line with the currents of interpretation of the
ECHR.27 Indeed, the government seems to invite a direct conflict with
international law.
In practice, the law has been very effective at limiting the discussion of
homosexuality in public: though seldom used for prosecution, the vague
definition of the outlawed behavior has created a widespread chilling ef-
fect on speech.28 The law has also had the secondary effect of defining
LGBT Russians as enemies of the state. This new trope designates certain
groups as “undesirable” because they represent some type of “fifth col-
umn” of a dangerous European influence intent on destroying Russia.29
While LGBT Russians are far from the only group to suffer from this kind
of distinction, they are thereby turned into a political enemy of Russia
user requests. At time of writing, the effects of implementation of the law are still unclear.
See Olga Razumovskaya, Russia Relaxes its Right to be Forgotten, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS BLOG
(June 30, 2015, 12:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/06/30/russia-relaxes-its-right-to-be-
forgotten/.
26. “The exercise of these freedoms . . . may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society . . .
for the protection of health or morals . . .” European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10,
Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. 005 [hereinafter ECHR].
27. See, e.g., Alekseyev I, ¶¶ 78-81 (addressing government invocation of public morals
as a ground to suspending Article 11 rights); see also Venice Commission, Opinion 707 / 2012,
Opinion on the Issue of the Prohibition of So-Called “Propaganda of Homosexuality” in the
Light of Recent Legislation in Some Member States of the Council of Europe, ¶ 51, CDL-
AD(2013)022 (June 18, 2013), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
AD%282013%29022-e (“As already mentioned, the existence of a European wide consensus
on the right to freedom of expression to campaign for the recognition of sexual minorities’
rights narrows the state’s margin of appreciation concerning the necessary measures for the
protection of public morality.”).
28. See, e.g., Joshua Keating, The Chilling Effects of Russia’s Anti-Gay Law, One Year
Later, SLATE (Oct. 9, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/10/09/rus-
sian_lgbt_activists_on_the_effects_of_gay_propaganda_law.html (“[M]any Russian journal-
ists don’t like to cover LGBT questions. They fear being punished by this homophobic law.”).
29. Such rhetoric has become almost commonplace among Russian officials and me-
dia. See, e.g., President Vladimir Putin, Address by President of the Russian Federation
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 (speech to the State Duma
on the annexation of Crimea, in which Putin suggests that Western governments may be
behind domestic discontent by creating a “fifth column” and “national traitors.”).
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without the requirement of having any particular political views at all. The
rise in homophobic attacks on LGBT Russians suggests that some see the
2013 law as implicit license to attack LGBT Russians with virtual
impunity.30
A. Interpreting the 2013 Law
  The history and overt purpose of the law deliberately run afoul of the
ECtHR position on rights under the ECHR. The 2013 law was introduced
as an amendment to the 2010 Federal Law No. 436-FZ, “On Protection of
Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development,”
which introduced stringent new standards for communication deemed
“harmful” to children.31 The original 2010 law contains a list of informa-
tion that is “prohibited from dissemination among children,” among which
is information that contains pornographic material, encourages children to
hurt themselves or to engage in unlawful behavior or violence, or  “contra-
dicts family values or encourages disrespect to parents and (or) other fam-
ily members.”32 In 2012, the law was amended to require Internet and
broadcast media to indicate the age-appropriateness of material.33 Be-
cause both the 2010 and 2012 laws ostensibly pursued legitimate state in-
terests, they faced little direct challenge, but even at this stage some
expressed discomfort that regulators seemed to be heading toward re-
stricting speech.34
30. See, e.g. License to Harm: Violence & Harassment Against LGBT People & Activ-
ists in Russia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1, 23-25, 36-40 (2014) [hereinafter License to Harm],
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/russia1214_ForUpload.pdf (documenting “an
increase in attacks by vigilante groups and individuals against LGBT people . . . that has
taken place in the lead-up to and aftermath of the adoption of the 2013 anti-LGBT
law . . . .[and] the authorities’ overall lack of a proper response to such violence,” as well as
statements by President Putin and others suggesting that acceptance of homosexuality is de-
viant and is related to European values inappropriate for Russia).
31. Federalny zakon RF o zashite detei ot informatsii prichinyayushey vred ikh
zdorov’yu i razvitiyu [Federal law of RF on the protection of children from information
harmful to their health and development], ROS. GAZ. (Dec. 3, 2010) art. 1, § 1, http://
www.rg.ru/2010/12/31/deti-inform-dok.html.
32. Id. art. 5, § 2.
33. See Recomendatsii Federalnoi sluzhby po nadzoru v sfere cvyazi informatsionnykh
tekhnologii i massovykh kommunikatsii (Roskomnadzor) [Recommendations of Federal ser-
vice for the supervision in the sphere of information technologies and mass communications
(Roskomnadzor)], ROS. GAZ. Sept. 5 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2012/09/05/informacia-site-
dok.html.
34. See, e.g., Russia: Internet Legislation Merits Greater Scrutiny Before Passage,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 11, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/11/russia-internet-
legislation-merits-greater-scrutiny-passage.
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After the protests surrounding the deeply flawed 2011 parliamentary
election35 and the 2012 presidential election,36 the government increas-
ingly pursued the means to suppress dissent. A variety of bills were pro-
posed to confront supposed threats of Western influence, including the
prohibition of U.S. citizens from adopting Russian children,37 the listing of
NGOs with international funding as “foreign agents,”38 and criminal sanc-
tions for people who do not register dual Russian-foreign citizenship.39
It was in this context that the 2013 law was proposed. It modified the
2010 law by adding the phrase “by propagandizing non-traditional sexual
relations” after “family values,”40 opening a great deal of speech to possi-
35. See Org. for Sec. and Cooperation in Eur. Parliamentary Assembly [OSCE PA],
International Election Observation–Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, at 1 (Dec. 5,
2011), http://www.osce.org/odihr/85757 (“[The] lack of a level playing field during the electo-
ral process . . . did not provide the necessary conditions for fair electoral competition.”);
Kratkoe zayavlenie assotsiatsii “GOLOS” po itogam vyborov nablyudeniya khoda vyborov
deputatov Gosudarstvennoi dumi Rossii, naznachenykh na 4 dekabrya 2011 g. [Short an-
nouncement of the association “GOLOS” on the results of election observation of voting for
members of the Government Duma of Russia.], GOLOS, http://archive.golos.org/asset/5223
(last visited Nov. 29, 2015). See also Michael Schwirtz and David M. Herszenhorn, Voters
Watch Polls in Russia, and Fraud Is What They See, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/world/europe/russian-parliamentary-elections-criticized-by-
west.html.
36. See, e.g., Russia’s Presidential Election Marked by Unequal Campaign Conditions,
Active Citizens’ Engagement, International Observers Say, OSCE NEWSROOM (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/88661; Press Release, GOLOS, 5 March Statement (Mar.
6, 2015), http://archive.golos.org/news/5239 (“The Elections of the President of the Russian
Federation were not free and fair, and did not meet the requirements imposed by Russian
legislation and international electoral standards.”); Ellen Barry and Michael Schwirtz, After
Election, Putin Faces Challenges to Legitimacy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/observers-detail-flaws-in-russian-election.html.
37. See “A Law on Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights
and Freedoms of Russian Citizens Has Been Signed,” KREMLIN.RU (Dec. 28, 2012) (adminis-
tration press release on signing of adoption ban), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/
17233; Russia: Reject Adoption Ban Bill, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (updated Dec. 28, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/21/russia-reject-adoption-ban-bill (“It’s wrong to make vul-
nerable children pawns in a cynical act of political retribution.”). See also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, LAWS OF ATTRITION: CRACKDOWN ON RUSSIA’S CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER PUTIN’S RE-
TURN TO THE PRESIDENCY 42-45 (2013) (describing the law’s effects on NGO operation)
[hereinafter Laws of Attrition].
38. Laws of Attrition at 12-20 (outlining the law and its operation in suppressing NGO
activity). The foreign agent law has been responsible for closing a several Russian NGOs,
including groups whose funding is provided solely by Russian citizens through foreign bank
accounts. See generally Russia: Government Against Rights Groups, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(July 8, 2015), http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/08/russia-government-against-rights-groups.
See also Vladimir Polkrovsky, Russia’s only private science funder closes its doors, SCIENCE
MAGAZINE (July 9, 2015), http://news.sciencemag.org/europe/2015/07/russias-only-private-
science-funder-closes-its-doors.
39. Alissa de Carbonnel, Russia Moves to Make Failure to Declare Dual Citizenship a
Crime, REUTERS (May 20, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/us-russia-bill-du-
alcitizens-idUSBREA4J0MJ20140520.
40. For the textual changes, see the 2013 law, supra note 1, art. 1, (adding language to
the 2010 law), supra note 31, art. 5, § 2.4.
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ble sanction.41 The banning of “homosexual propaganda” had been
piloted in several Russian regions prior to the national legislation, and the
CCRF had given its blessing to the theory that these laws protected vul-
nerable minors.42 The ambiguous wording of the law and the definition by
negative provides a broad range of available definitions for “non-tradi-
tional sexual relations.” The administrative code was updated to include a
section on appropriate punishment for such propaganda, with fines rang-
ing from 5,000 rubles (about $160 in early 2013) for individuals to one
million rubles for corporations. Immediately, government authorities who
sought contrast with Europe had a social cause to fight for (halting the
supposed spread of homosexuality from the decadent West), as well as a
flexible assertion of independence from the international legal order and
the legal means to enforce general control over opponents through an
open-ended statute.
1. Effects of the Law
  The most widespread consequence of the 2013 law has been the abrupt
end of discourse about gay rights for fear of being prosecuted for spread-
ing some kind of ill-defined “propaganda.” As one U.S. State Department
official has noted, policies based on the 2013 law are “not just a limitation
of speech for LGBT people, they’re a limitation for all Russians” because
all Russians—not just LGBT Russians—are banned from discussing “non-
traditional” relationships in public.43 This incentive for self-regulation of
liberal-leaning members of civil society may in fact have been the main
intent of the law.44
At the same time, hateful rhetoric about LGBT people runs un-
checked on state-sponsored media, including a memorable observation by
popular commentator Dmitry Kiselyov that LGBT people should not be
allowed to donate blood, and that “their hearts, in case of a car accident,
should be buried in the ground or burned as unsuitable for the continua-
tion of life.”45 Although certain well-known members of the media criti-
cized the law—including a memorable and very public exchange between
an irreverent socialite and the law’s main sponsor about the applicability
of the law to oral sex between heterosexual spouses46—the criticism of the
41. Maria Issaeva & Maria Kiskachi, Immoral Truth vs. Untruthful Morals? Attempts
to Render Rights and Freedoms Conditional Upon Sexual Orientation in Light of Russia’s
International Obligations, 2 Russ. L.J. 82, 86 (2014).
42. Id. at 88-90.
43. Khristiana Narizhnaya, Russia’s Assault on ‘Gay’ Free Speech, GLOBAL POST
(Mar. 18, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/russia/
120316/gay-rights-russia-battle-free-speech.
44. Rebecca Favret, Comment: Back to the Bad Old Days: President Putin’s Hold on
Free Speech in the Russian Federation, 12 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 299, 315 (2012-13).
45. License to Harm, supra note 30, at 24-25.
46. See Masha Lipman, The Battle over Russia’s Anti-Gay Law, THE NEW YORKER
(Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/08/the-battle-over-
russias-anti-gay-law.html.
Fall 2015] Russia’s “Gay Propaganda” Law 203
law has been muted by widespread public support for the measure and
increasing pressure on the media to conform to government control.
The lack of robust public discussion about or legal analysis of the law
increases the difficulty of assessing how many people have been charged
with its violation, but a handful of gay rights activists and journalists have
been convicted and fined under the 2013 law.47 Because lower courts in
Russia are not required to publish their reasoning, it is not clear how the
law is being interpreted.
At least one defendant, Elena Klimova, was initially acquitted of
charges brought under the law,48 but she has since been convicted on
charges similar to the first.49 Her case may be instructive as to what the
government is willing to do with the law. Klimova was charged based on
her work with a website called Children-404, which is named as a refer-
ence to the error browsers return for non-existent web addresses. The pur-
pose of the site is to provide a forum in which LGBT children can express
their identity and find support as they attempt to navigate the complexities
of gender identity in Russia today.50 It is therefore unclear under a plain
reading of the law whether Children-404 can reasonably be considered to
propagandize “non-traditional sexual relations” by trying to normalize
LGBT identity.
Vitaly Milonov, member of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly,
author of the city’s anti-gay propaganda ordinance, and an anti-gay ac-
tivist, has said that he believes Children-404 “should be closed, destroyed,
wiped away from all of the social networks of Russia,” and believes it is in
clear violation of the 2013 law.51 However, the law is not necessarily inter-
preted as broadly as Milonov would like. Even Milonov’s allies seem un-
sure of how the law should be applied. Shortly after the 2013 law was
passed, the law’s author, Elena Mizulina, stated her opinion that the 2013
law does not affect Children-404. “Such a project doesn’t relate to propa-
ganda about non-traditional sexual relations,” she explained. “Information
that explains, describes, but doesn’t call for action, is not provocative, and
doesn’t depict non-traditional sexual relations is not propaganda and, ac-
47. Laura Mills, How Russia Enforces Its Ban on Gay ‘Propaganda’, AP (Feb. 6,
2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/how-russia-enforces-its-ban-gay-propaganda.
48. Russian Journalist Accused of Anti-gay Propaganda Defeats Charges, AMNESTY
INT’L (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.amnesty.ca/our-work/good-news/russian-journalist-accused-
of-anti-gay-propaganda-defeats-charges.
49. LGBT Community Blacklisted on Charges of Propagating Suicide and Homosexu-
ality, MEDUZA (Feb. 2, 2015), https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/02/02/lgbt-community-black-
listed-on-charges-of-propagating-suicide-and-homosexuality.
50. Kirill Artëmenko, “Etot zakon ub’yot kakoe-to kolichestvo detei” [“This law will
kill some number of children”], LENTA.RU (June 4, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://lenta.ru/articles/
2013/06/04/gaykids/; 404 NOT FOUND, http://www.deti-404.com/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
51. “Dolzhna byt’ zakryta, unichtozhena, sterta nasvegda” [“It should be closed, de-
stroyed, wiped away forever”], MEDUZA (Jan. 26, 2015, 10:46 AM), https://meduza.io/feature/
2015/01/26/dolzhna-byt-zakryta-unichtozhena-sterta-navsegda.
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cording to the law, can be made available to adolescents.”52 The CCRF
has also proposed an ‘information-campaigning’ distinction, though it has
not fleshed out the legal structure of such a difference.53 This nuanced
reading of the law seems designed to make a legal distinction between
facts and opinions, a legal doctrine that is not demanded by the text but
which softens its application. However, Klimova was later convicted on a
different count for her work on Children-404.54 The back-and-forth over
Klimova’s case seems to have thrown into doubt even the Constitutional
Court’s vague ‘information-campaigning’ distinction. Shortly after the first
court rescinded the fine it had imposed, a court in St. Petersburg an-
nounced that it had found against Klimova under the 2013 law.55 Worse,
law enforcement appears to interpret the 2013 law very broadly. Among
the provided examples of propaganda is publishing “lists of famous living
or deceased gay individuals” or “out of context” statistics suggesting that
gay couples “are ‘no worse than straight couples at coping with parental
responsibilities.’”56 Without a clearer sense of the legal limits of “propa-
ganda,” it is unclear what kinds of information violate the law.
2. The 2013 Law under the Russian Constitution
  The 2013 law represents a growing tendency of the Russian legal system
to challenge the fundamental human rights on which its authority rests.
The Constitution of the Russian Federation57 was designed to reflect inter-
national human rights law both in substance and by integrating interna-
tional law directly into the domestic legal order. Four sections of the
Constitution require attention in connection with the 2013 law: Article 29,
which provides for the freedom of speech (but allows the prohibition of
propaganda); Article 19, which provides protection against discrimination;
and Articles 15 and 46, which incorporate international law into the Rus-
sian legal system.
Although the CCRF seems unlikely to review the 2013 law, the Con-
stitution includes provisions for the incorporation of international human
rights standards into the legal system, undermining the law’s basic thrust.
Article 15 provides that treaties and “[g]enerally recognized principles and
52. Ekaterina Vinokurova, “Liudei ved’ razdrazhaiut ne gei, a propaganda” [“After all,
people are irritated not by gays, but by propaganda”], GAZETA.RU (June 10, 2013, 8:36 PM)
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/06/10_a_5375845.shtml.
53. Issaeva & Kiskachi, supra note 41, at 91. The basic idea seems to be that to share
information is one thing, running a social campaign (trying to convince others) is another.
54. Jeff Stone, Founder of ‘Children-404’ LGBT Support Group Convicted Under Rus-
sia’s Anti-Gay Propaganda Law, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2015, 4:17 PM), http://
www.ibtimes.com/founder-children-404-lgbt-support-group-convicted-under-russias-anti-gay-
propaganda-1793890.
55. Christopher Plummer, A Revolving Door of Court Verdicts Against Children-404,
HUM. RTS. FIRST (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/revolving-door-court-
verdicts-against-children-404.
56. Issaeva & Kiskachi, supra note 41, at 95.
57. KONST. RF, supra note 10, at 652.
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norms of international law . . . constitute an integral part of [the] legal
system” and should therefore exercise a measure of direct effect by over-
riding domestic law in the event of conflicting standards.58 Article 17 pro-
vides that “[t]he rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen shall be
recognized and guaranteed in the Russian Federation in conformity with
generally recognized principles and norms of international law and in ac-
cordance with this Constitution.”59 It has been the responsibility of the
Constitutional Court to interpret what qualifies as a “[g]enerally recog-
nized principle of international law,” and to do so the CCRF has consist-
ently relied on the decisions of the ECtHR, of which Russia is a
member.60
The direct integration of international law into the Russian system is
further bolstered by Article 46 Section 3, which provides that “everyone
shall have the right, in accordance with international treaties of the Rus-
sian Federation, to apply to inter-state organs concerned with the protec-
tion of human rights and freedoms if all available domestic remedies of
legal protection have been exhausted.”61 This reference to “inter-state or-
gans” appears to be a deliberate reference to an international court system
very much like the ECtHR, and was likely drafted with the Court in
mind.62
These provisions provide a vital backstop for the protection of human
rights in the Russian legal system. The Constitution demonstrates a re-
markable commitment to the infrastructure of international law and natu-
rally leads to the conclusion that the ECHR provisions and the decisions
of the ECtHR should have a strong influence on the interpretation of the
2013 law. Legal scholars generally have accepted that, by one mechanism
or another, ECtHR rulings are automatically binding law in Russia.63
However, Constitutional Court Chairman Valery Zorkin first suggested
several years ago that the role of the ECtHR in the Russian legal system
58. Id. at 690, art. 15, § 4.
59. Id. at 691, art. 17, § 1. It is important to note that the actual wording of this provi-
sion does provide space for the interpretation that the Constitution would govern in the
event of a conflict; however, until recently, the consensus was that international law should
have binding effect on national law. This point is discussed in more detail below. See also
Angelika Nussberger, The Reception Process in Russia and Ukraine, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS
603, 617 (Alec Stone Sweet & Hellen Keller eds., 2008). Given the other provisions in the
Constitution it seems clear that international law should have some sort of binding effect in
the Russian legal order.
60. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 33.
61. KONST. RF, supra note 10, at 696, art. 46, § 3.
62. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 253-55.
63. See, e.g., Nussberger, supra note 59, at 617 (“The primacy of the ECHR in relation
to statutory law is generally not called into doubt. The status of the Convention in the hierar-
chy is, however, controversial, that is whether it ranks on a par with the Constitution or with
constitutional laws or whether it occupies an intermediate rank between constitutional laws
and statutory laws.”) (footnote omitted). See also BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 17.
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should be more narrowly construed.64 The CCRF’s response to the
ECtHR Markin v. Russia ruling asserts the CCRF’s supreme power of re-
view over the application and interpretation of all law in Russia, which
leaves the authority of ECtHR rulings in an indeterminate position.65 That
line of reasoning has continued in recent cases, culminating in the Consti-
tutional Court’s response to a request from the Duma concerning ECtHR
rulings.66 That ruling notes Russian law’s surface resemblance to the rul-
ings of other European constitutional courts regarding the primacy of the
supranational body of law over the national constitution, but the context
of the cases in which these assertions are made clearly assert a resistance
to the pull of international law. Whether such resistance will have an effect
on the law’s fate depends largely on how binding the ECtHR can make its
rulings in Russia.
3. Freedom of Expression
  Article 29 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation provides that
“[e]veryone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought and speech”67 and
that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freely seek, receive, transmit, pro-
duce and disseminate information in any lawful way.”68 Article 29 only
explicitly allows the limiting of free speech in terms of “[p]ropaganda or
agitation inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity,”69
which is not protected.70 Article 29.5 provides that media shall be free and
that censorship shall be prohibited.71
Based on the official title of the 2013 law, it seems that the propa-
ganda exception is the provision from which the legislature derives its au-
thority to limit public expressions of support for LGBT relationships.
Since the categories of constitutionally prohibited propaganda do not
seem to apply, it is unclear what the term “propaganda” actually achieves
64. BURNHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 18. See also Press Release, CCFR Chairman
Valery Zor’kin, “Predel ustupchivosti” [The limit of compliance], ROS. GAZ. Oct. 29, (2010)
http://www.rg.ru/2010/10/29/zorkin.html.
65. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF ot 6 dekabrya 2013 g., N 27-P
[Ruling of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of Dec. 6, 2013, No. 27-P], ROS.
GAZ. Dec. 18, 2013, § 3.2, http://www.rg.ru/2013/12/18/ks-dok.html. 
66. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF ot 14 iiulia 2015 g., N 21-P [Ruling of
the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, No. 21-P], ROS. GAZ. July 27, 2015, § 5.3, rg.ru/
2015/07/27/ks-dok.html. Of course, the CCRF is short on specifics as to why conforming to
the ECtHR rulings in relation to LGBT rights or paying shareholders from forcibly priva-
tized oil companies (the impetus of the question by the Duma members) might threaten
Russian constitutional rights.
67. KONST. RF, supra note 10, at 693, art. 29, § 1.
68. Id. art. 29, § 4.
69. Id. art. 29, § 2.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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in the law in terms of legal reasoning. Discussing positive views on sexual
relationships does not presuppose any enmity or hatred of any other
group. Even assuming the government’s argument that the expression of
LGBT normalcy could somehow corrupt the minds of children at all (let
alone to the level of requiring federal legal intervention), if the mere ex-
pression of support for LGBT relationships might incite “social or relig-
ious hatred,” it seems that the constitution would allow the limitation of a
virtually limitless range of opinions. Such a broad reading of the propa-
ganda provision would essentially render the constitutional protections for
expression a dead letter.
If the law is not designed to prevent any of the prohibited types of
propaganda, it is not clear how it justifies itself under the explicit provi-
sions of the Constitution. Without this basis, the law rests on an evaluation
by the legislature that the expression of the normalcy of LGBT sexual
relationships is a greater threat to public morals than it is valuable as free
speech, and that the danger to the public is so great that a suspension of
the freedom of expression is appropriate. The perceived threats to chil-
dren behind the 2013 law are unverified by the law and left unsupported
by hard evidence.72 The supposed danger is assumed by the 2013 law, leav-
ing the necessity and proportionality of the measure in doubt. In evaluat-
ing the appropriateness of limiting speech under the purported danger, the
law also presents a notice problem by way of its uncertain scope, leaving a
good deal of discretion in the hand of courts and law enforcement. In
short, instead of presenting means for a proportionality analysis, the 2013
law presumes its own conclusion in order to achieve its intended result: to
limit speech on a topic that the government has found politically useful.
4. Non-Discrimination
  The Russian Constitution protects citizens against discrimination in Arti-
cle 19, requiring that the state guarantee “the equality of rights” without
regard to various categories such as sex, nationality, language, attitude to
religion, and “other circumstances.”73 The CCRF has not interpreted
“other circumstances” to explicitly include sexual orientation, but there is
nothing in the Constitution to suggest that sexual orientation would natu-
rally be excluded—and much to suggest that the European definition
should be followed, based on the language of Articles 15 and 17 of the
ECHR. Indeed, even in its 2014 ruling in Alekseyev v. Russia (hereinafter
Alekseyev II), rejecting the necessity to protect the freedom of expression
concerning “non-traditional sexual relationships,” the CCRF seems to ges-
72. There has been no new evidence presented by the Russian government since Alek-
seyev I, in which the ECtHR noted, “There is no scientific evidence or sociological data at the
Court’s disposal suggesting that the mere mention of homosexuality, or open public debate
about sexual minorities’ social status, would adversely affect children.” Alekseyev I, ¶ 86.
73. KONST. RF, supra note 10, at 691, art. 19.
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ture toward minority sexual identities as being a natural part of Article 19
of the Russian constitution.74
In any event, as with the suspension of the freedom of expression, the
law presumes its own conclusions to prove the necessity for discriminating
on the basis of gender identity. In a legal environment that takes rights
seriously, it would be a simple matter to point out the failure to balance
the right to non-discrimination and strike down the law. That balancing
seems unlikely to occur in Russian courts for the same reasons that the law
has not been struck down on free expression concerns.
III. ECHR PROTECTIONS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
  The legal implications of the 2013 law demonstrate why the freedom of
expression is critical to the maintenance of democratic principles. ECHR
Article 10 allows for the limitation of the freedom of expression under a
variety of circumstances not explicitly allowed under the Russian Consti-
tution, including protecting individual reputations, preserving confidential
information, and preserving public morals. It is the last criteria on which
the 2013 law depends, with the intent of protecting speech in opposition to
the interests of children or vulnerable adults. But Article 10 prefaces the
justifications for speech limitations by requiring them to be “necessary in a
democratic society.”75 As will be made clear, previous ECtHR case law
establishes that these restrictions do not meet the criteria of democratic
necessity.
While the rights to expression and assembly are not identical, the
Court’s emphatic defense of LGBT persons in relation to Article 11’s free-
dom of assembly has been constructed broadly and should also apply to
the 2013 law’s restriction of expression. The Court’s reasoning in
Ba̧czkowski and Alekseyev I made clear that governments will not be al-
lowed to invoke public safety or morality concerns to discriminate against
supporters of LGBT rights.
A. Laying the Groundwork: Article 11
  The ECtHR’s recent Article 11 jurisprudence lays out a clear case
against the restriction of assembly rights due to issues of sexual identity.
74. Postanovlenie Kostitutsionnogo Suda RF ot 23 sentiabria 2014 g. po delu o
proverke konstitutsionnosti chasti 1 stat’i 6.21 Kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ruling of the
Russian Federation Constitutional Court of Sept. 23, 2014 in the case of the testing of the
constitutionality of article 1 section 6.21 of the Codex of the Russian Federation], ROS. GAZ.
Oct. 3, 2014, § 2.1, rg.ru/2014/10/03/sud-dok.html [hereinafter Alekseyev II] (“This given con-
stitutional principle [of equality before the law], presuming also the inadmissibility of the
restriction of rights and freedoms or the creation of any privileges based on membership
within one or another social group, which term may be understood to include groups of per-
sons of particular sexual orientation, is made concrete in the norms of statue. . . .”) (emphasis
added). Of course, the Court later uses this equality of all groups to cut against the right of
expression of LGBT persons and their supporters if such expression is “capable of causing
harm to the rights and legal interests of other persons, primarily minors.” Id. § 2.2.
75. ECHR, supra note 26, art. 10, § 2.
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State policies disallowing gay rights parades have consistently been de-
feated in the Court, which has developed a strong jurisprudence that
LGBT rights are protected by European consensus and are not available
for public policy or margin of appreciation exceptions. In 2007, the
ECtHR ruled in Ba̧czkowski that city administrators failed to meet the
requirements of the law on road safety, sidestepping their arguments on
the grounds of public morals and public safety.76 However, on its way to
recognizing an Article 14 non-discrimination violation under its “other sta-
tus” criteria, the Court went further, noting that the Mayor’s publicly ex-
pressed opinions—that homosexuality is immoral and the parade is
“propaganda”—were sufficient to convince the court that the procedural
process to obtain a parade permit was discriminatory.77
Ba̧czkowski set the stage for an even more forceful ruling in Alekseyev
I, where the Court rejected the government’s claims to a margin of appre-
ciation and ruled that the exclusion of a gay pride parade in Moscow was
not justified under proportionality.78 The Court then engaged with the
government’s arguments concerning public safety, finding that the govern-
ment could not disallow the protest simply because some of their citizens
might violently oppose it (noting instead that it was the duty of the gov-
ernment to protect the protesters and prosecute perpetrators).79 The
Court also observed that, in its view, Russian law did not provide for any
limitation on gay rights parades due to public morals, and the Mayor’s
resistance to the parades on that account was therefore illegitimate.80 The
Court additionally recognized a broad European consensus rejecting the
restriction of basic rights through discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion.81 Accordingly, the Court found a violation of Articles 11, 13, and 14,
as it had in Ba̧czkowski, but under even more emphatic terms.
In response to the ECtHR’s conclusions, Moscow continued a cam-
paign of intransigence against gay pride parades, even after a change in
administration.82 In 2012, Moscow enacted a one-hundred-year ban on
any such demonstrations.83
1. European Consensus against LGBT Status as Legitimate
Criterion of Discrimination
Ba̧czkowski and Alekseyev I strongly suggest that European consensus
has been reached on the issue of assembly rights for LGBT activists. Al-
76. See Ba̧czkowski, ¶¶ 71-72.
77. Id. ¶ 100.
78. Alekseyev I, ¶¶ 69, 85-87.
79. Id. ¶¶ 76-77.
80. Id. ¶¶ 78-79.
81. Id. ¶ 83.
82. See Kristen L. Thomas, Note, We’re Here, We’re Queer, Get Used to It, 14 OR.
REV. INT’L L. 472, 505 (2012).
83. Daniel DeFraia, Moscow Bans Gay Pride Events for 100 Years, GLOBALPOST
(Aug. 17, 2012, 3:46 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/russia/
120817/moscow-bans-gay-pride-events-100-years.
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though Paul Johnson expresses concern that Alekseyev I continues the
ECtHR’s unclear and uneven reliance on European consensus in relation
to unsettled sexual orientation issues (like gay marriage),84 European con-
sensus on the issue of assembly is not in serious doubt. Beyond Ba̧czkow-
ski and Alekseyev I, evidence of a European consensus may be found in
statements made by the Council of Europe, which do not represent bind-
ing law but do serve as a succinct expression of the European position.
The Council’s Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5, cited by the ECtHR in
Alekseyev I as evidence of the European position,85 calls on states to re-
dress “direct or indirect” discrimination based on sexual orientation and to
“ensure respect for the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans-
gender persons and to promote tolerance towards them.”86 In section 16
of the appendix, the Council argues explicitly that “Member states should
take appropriate measures to prevent restrictions on the effective enjoy-
ment of the rights to freedom of expression . . . for example on grounds of
public health, public morality and public order.”87 Unlike in the religious
expression cases, the Court and the Council do not hesitate to assert a
bold line on the connection between non-discrimination and the right of
assembly.
2. The Necessity Test
  Article 11, like many other articles of the ECHR, provides for situations
in which a citizen’s assembly rights can be limited by her or his state as
long as the restriction is “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a demo-
cratic society” under specific criteria, including “for the health or
morals . . . of others.”88 These doctrines set outlines for what this clause
encompasses, but are not immediately clear. The contours of the necessity
requirement have shifted over time, but least in relation to LGBT Europe-
ans’ assembly rights, the ECtHR has made itself very clear. In Alekseyev I,
the Court ruled that a Moscow city ordinance banning gay pride parades
violated the ECHR because “irrespective of the . . . domestic lawfulness of
the ban, [the ban] fell short of being necessary in a democratic society.”89
The Court makes a distinction between “substantive rights” for LGBT
Europeans and “their right to campaign for such rights,” suggesting that
84. Paul Johnson, Homosexuality, Freedom of Assembly and the Margin of Apprecia-
tion Doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights: Alekseyev v. Russia, 11 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 578, 593 (2011).
85. Alekseyev I, ¶ 51.
86. Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Minis-
ters to Member States on Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orienta-
tion or Gender Identity, in COMBATING DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION OR GENDER IDENTITY 7, 8 (2011).
87. Id. at 10.
88. ECHR, supra note 26, art. 11, § 2.
89. Alekseyev I,  ¶ 69.
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there is no room for a margin of appreciation in the latter due to a settled
European consensus.90
Paul Johnson argues that the centrality of the necessity test in Alek-
seyev I is significant because it clarifies that “in those States that continue
to enact legislation with the intention of restricting the freedom of expres-
sion and assembly of homosexuals . . . [and even though] such restriction
[might] be in accordance with the law, it will now be less likely to meet the
necessity test of the Court.”91 While Johnson laments the ECtHR’s lack of
consistency on issues like gay marriage, he notes a “progressive narrowing
of the margin of appreciation afforded to States in respect of sexual orien-
tation issues.”92 Thus, while Alekseyev I does not solve all LGBT rights
issues—let alone questions of the workings of the application of the mar-
gin of appreciation—it nonetheless strengthens the theory of a shrinking
margin of appreciation, absorbed into the necessity test at least as it re-
lates to Article 11 rights.
Even before Alekseyev I, the Court indicated that, at least as far as the
assembly rights of LGBT Europeans go, the margin of appreciation relies
directly on European consensus, prescription of the action by law, and the
necessity test. In Ba̧czkowski, the ECtHR held in that case that Poland
failed to apply its restriction “as prescribed by law,” but also implied that
the restriction would not have met the necessity test in any event.93 In
Alekseyev I, the Court again did not balance the intervention according to
democratic necessity, noting that a clear European consensus already ex-
ists on the question of the right of LGBT Europeans to march.94 While the
mysterious workings of the margin of appreciation continue to be unclear,
the necessity test seems to create a strong limitation for its application.
Alec Stone Sweet goes even further, arguing that the already-narrow mar-
gin of appreciation has essentially been absorbed into the necessity test,
having been subsumed under the proportionality analysis, and “thus
shrinks as consensus on higher standards of rights protection emerges
within the regime.”95 While Stone Sweet’s assessment might be an over-
statement on the general state of the margin of appreciation, his observa-
tion resonates with the subtext of recent LGBT cases. From a certain point
of view, the necessity test portion of proportionality analysis has become
so important in these cases that the margin of appreciation no longer has
any independent effect.
90. Id. ¶ 84.
91. Johnson, supra note 84, at 583-84.
92. Id. at 589-90.
93. Ba̧czkowski ¶¶ 69-71.
94. Alekseyev I, ¶¶ 83-84.
95. Alec Stone Sweet, On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The European
Court of Human Rights as a Constitutional Court, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP SER, Paper 71, at 20 5-
6, (2009) http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/71 [hereinafter Stone Sweet].
212 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:191
3. Inapplicability of the Margin of Appreciation
  The relationship between the margin of appreciation and Article 10 has
its roots in Handyside v. United Kingdom.96 In a case where the defendant
had been convicted on an obscenity charge, the Court noted that the free-
dom of expression “constitutes one of the essential foundations” of demo-
cratic societies, “applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indiffer-
ence, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”97 The ECtHR inter-
preted the necessity requirement of Article 10 in such a way as to give
state governments some ability to define an appropriate level of free ex-
pression, as long as they defined Article 10’s “necessary in a democratic
society” somewhere between “reasonable” and “absolutely necessary.”98
Even so, the Court immediately noted that “the domestic margin of appre-
ciation goes hand in hand with European supervision,” leaving for itself
the final say in what kinds of situations it would be willing to defer to
states, “both as to the aim of the measure challenged and to its ‘neces-
sity.’”99 The court also introduced the principle of European consensus
(noting the lack of “a uniform European conception of morals”).100
The seeds of a narrow interpretation of the margin of appreciation
were already sown in Handyside: although in practice the UK was allowed
to set the definition of public morals, the ECtHR reserved to itself the
final say on what “necessary” means.101 In theory at least, the margin of
appreciation represents a balance between the Court and contracting
states: it is a recognition by the Court that it will not use its authority to
“encroach upon the primary duty of Member States to protect the rights
and freedoms enshrined in the European Convention.”102 This deference
“is also consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, an inherent quality of
the European system.”103 In practice, the scope of the margin of apprecia-
tion varies considerably depending on the context and the type of activity
being restricted. For example, the margin of appreciation on the freedom
of expression varies dramatically between the right to criticize the govern-
ment, where the margin is narrow, and the right to engage in hateful
speech, where the margin granted to state discretion is wide.104
An illustration of one area where the margin of appreciation is still
quite active—the relationship between the state and religious expres-
96. Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, ¶ 48
(1976), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b6fb8.html.
97. Id. ¶ 49.
98. Id. ¶¶ 47-48.
99. Id. ¶ 49.
100. Id. ¶ 48.
101. See id. ¶ 49.
102. Onder Bakircioglu, The Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in
Freedom of Expression and Public Morality Cases, 8 GERMAN L.J. 711, 717 (2007).
103. Id. at 717.
104. Id. at 723, 726.
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sion—should be helpful in demonstrating why the margin of appreciation
will not provide state discretion in granting basic expression rights to
LGBT persons. In its Lautsi v. Italy ruling—decided the same year as
Alekseyev I—the ECtHR left standing an Italian law requiring the display
of crosses in public classrooms, but only under narrow criteria.105 The core
of the ruling allows a state to make use of the margin of appreciation in
“the decision whether or not to perpetuate a tradition” as long as rights
are substantially protected.106 The Court bases its evaluation on the idea
that “a crucifix on a wall is an essentially passive symbol” that imposed no
“compulsory teaching about Christianity.”107 This may sound like broad
permission, but the Court suggests that the margin of appreciation is still
not a blank check: the state must respond in some measure to the necessity
test when imposing restrictions on religious expression, even where the
margin of appreciation should apply.
Lautsi was decided in the context of several cases where the Court
afforded the state considerable flexibility in denying public school employ-
ees the ability to wear religious apparel while at work.108 The Court em-
phasized the role of the margin of appreciation in another of these cases,
noting in Dogru v. France that “in France, as in Turkey or Switzerland,
secularism is a constitutional principle . . . . [A]n attitude which fails to
respect that principle will not necessarily be accepted as being covered by
the freedom to manifest one’s religion and will not enjoy the protection of
Article 9 of the Convention.”109 Here, the ECtHR seems to invoke a local
constitutional principle as a legitimate reason to apply the margin of ap-
preciation, but not just any constitutional principle would apply. It appears
that the Court, recognizing that there is no European consensus on the
appropriate relationship between religion and the state, simultaneously
recognizes that secularism passes the necessity test.
It is relatively clear, based on the use of the margin of appreciation in
religious expression, that the conditions necessary for the application of
the margin of appreciation are present in Lautsi—namely, a lack of Euro-
pean consensus and the requirement that the restrictions on rights be nec-
essary in a democratic society. The same criteria are not present in the
case of the restriction of expression as it relates to gender identity and
acknowledging the existence of same-sex relationships. This difference is
crucial for understanding the operation of the margin of appreciation and
105. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-104040.
106. Id. ¶ 68.
107. Id. ¶¶ 72-74.
108. See, e.g., Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 122 (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70956 (holding that Turkey can prohibit female students
at a public university from wearing headscarves under its constitutional doctrine of
secularism).
109. Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, Eur. Ct. of H.R. ¶ 72 (2009), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90039.
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its seemingly shrinking scope: where there is no European consensus,
there is a greater margin of appreciation, and vice versa.110
The ECtHR has also followed that line of reasoning in protecting the
rights of LGBT Europeans, as demonstrated in Baczkowski and Alekseyev
I, by recognizing a European consensus on at least some issues of LGBT
rights. The Court made it very clear in Alekseyev I that the “right to cam-
paign”—a phrase as easily applicable to the freedom of expression as to
the freedom of assembly—would be protected for LGBT Europeans, even
if “substantive rights” like marriage or adoption lacked a European
consensus.111
Paul Johnson laments the ECtHR’s inconsistency on LGBT rights due
to its reliance on European consensus and the margin of appreciation, not-
ing “there is arguably no greater consensus across contracting states in
respect of the adoption of children by homosexuals than of same-sex mar-
riage.”112 Although Johnson focuses on the incomplete suite of protec-
tions the ECtHR has provided LGBT Europeans, he also notes that the
margin of appreciation afforded states on LGBT rights issues has “pro-
gressive[ly] narrow[ed]” over time.113 By now, it is clear that the Court is
committed to using the doctrine in a manner that reflects the current polit-
ical and social conditions of Europe, and that certain LGBT rights are a
settled question for the ECtHR. This pattern allows us to predict with
some confidence that the Court would find against the state in a case con-
cerning the 2013 law under Article 10.
4. Applying Article 11 Jurisprudence to Article 10: Alekseyev II
In principle, Article 10 rights to expression need not automatically be
protected identically to Article 11 rights to assembly and association under
the ECHR.114 On the other hand, taking into consideration the applica-
tion of the necessity test in Article 11 cases, if Russia cannot discriminate
against gay pride parades based on public morals, it almost certainly can-
not discriminate more broadly against the mere public discussion of “non-
110. Furthermore, the ECtHR does not appear to be strictly limited to a regional Euro-
pean consensus, taking into account the law and practice of states outside of Europe. While
this expansion of the sample of states in some ways questions the European nature of the
consensus required, the court seems unlikely to apply law from states where expression of
sexual orientation is not protected, strengthening the case that European consensus has been
reached. See, e.g., Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, The Increasingly Marginal Appreciation of
the Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine, 7 GER. L.J. 611, 617-18 (2006) (noting that “in some
instances, as in the case of Christine Goodwin, the Court has gone beyond the comparison of
the law and practice of European States [concerning transsexual rights] to refer to the exis-
tence of an international trend favourable to the phenomenon in question.”)
111. Alekseyev I, ¶ 84.
112. Johnson, supra note 84, at 590.
113. See id. at 589.
114. For a detailed discussion of ECtHR Article 11 law that parallels Article 10 con-
cerns, see Johnson, supra note 84, at 583-88.
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traditional sexual relations” based on Article 10.115 Not only do the re-
strictions in the 2013 law fail to meet the requirements of Article 10 (or
any other acceptable criteria under Article 29 of the Russian Constitu-
tion), but the ECtHR has also already demonstrated that European con-
sensus and a strengthened necessity test protect the rights to assembly and
expression for LGBT Europeans.116 While the application of the margin
of appreciation has sometimes been extremely slippery in cases where the
freedom of expression and public morals conflict,117 the additional feature
of a recognized European consensus on what might be called “campaign-
ing rights” for LGBT Europeans118—whose reasoning applies just as eas-
ily to Article 10 as Article 11—changes the calculus decisively against the
government. When the ECtHR at length hears a case on the 2013 law, it
seems inevitable that the Court will find Russia in violation of the ECHR.
The remaining questions are what the CCRF will do in response, and what
the conflict means for the binding power of the ECHR.
Perhaps the leading case under the 2013 law already accepted at the
ECtHR is being litigated by a group of applicants which includes Nikolay
Alekseyev, the same applicant as in Alekseyev I. In Alekseyev II,119 the
applicants were prosecuted under the 2013 law and were required to pay
an administrative fine of 4,000 rubles (around $125 at the time) after pick-
eting in front of a children’s library with signs that read “Gay propaganda
doesn’t exist” and “Gays aren’t made, gays are born!”120 Another appli-
cant displayed a sign which read, “To be gay and to love gays is normal. To
beat gays and lynch gays is criminal.”121 The applicants denied that their
action could amount to propaganda because they were in fact sharing ob-
jective information that had no ill effect on the health, morals, or spiritual
growth of adolescents.122
The CCRF found that, while sexual identity does fall under the “other
protected groups” criteria of non-discrimination under the Russian Consti-
tution, the right to discuss sexual relationships can be limited when it con-
flicts with the basis of authority of the Russian constitution, namely the
mixture of humanist, national-traditional, and confessional moral
115. See, e.g., Ba̧czkowski, ¶ 61 (grouping the necessity test in Article 11 with Articles
8, 9, and 10, and stating “the only necessity capable of justifying an interference with any of
the rights enshrined in those Articles is one that may claim to spring from a ‘democratic
society’”).
116. See Council of Europe, supra note 86, at 7-8. See also Genderdoc-M v. Moldova,
App. No. 9106/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 57-58 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-111394
(concluding that no additional examination of Article 10 rights are necessary in an Article 11
rights case, implying the same necessity test applies to both).
117. For an analysis of ECtHR decisions that reveal the Court’s struggle in attempting
to play a supervisory role in policing morals while respecting the margin of appreciation
afforded to states, see Bakircioglu, supra note 102, at 727-31.
118. Alekseyev I, ¶ 84.
119. See Alekseyev II.
120. Id. §§ 1-1.1.
121. Id. § 1.1.
122. Id.
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norms.123 Noting that there is no consensus in international law concern-
ing what might constitute information about sexuality that is harmful to
children,124 the Constitutional Court further found that the state’s respon-
sibility to care for the health of family formation is supported by Articles 7
and 38 of the Russian Constitution, as well as by Article 12 of the
ECHR.125 In pursuit of that goal, federal lawmakers can exercise broad
powers of discrimination in determining what is harmful to the healthy
development of children’s sexuality and how it should best protect socially
important values relating to motherhood, childhood, and family.126
The legal arguments in Alekseyev II leave little doubt as to what mes-
sage the Constitutional Court intends to send. Invoking primarily the duty
of the government to protect children’s health, the Constitutional Court
has set up a case that directly challenges the ECtHR’s Article 11 doctrine
concerning state duties under the ECHR in relation to public expression
of sexual identity and relationships. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court
appears to avoid any analysis of Russia’s right-protection responsibilities
under ECHR Articles 10 and 14, assuming perhaps that its granting of
broad authority to the legislature suffices as appropriate proportionality
analysis on Russia’s duties. In this context, the Constitutional Court’s re-
jection of Alekseyev’s motion that the law be reviewed in the ECtHR for
compatibility under the ECHR is more than a simple jurisdictional obser-
vation. Indeed, the Constitutional Court’s invocation of supremacy, its
confident citation of the Markin CCRF decision, and its characterization
of the ECtHR as “subsidiary according to its character as an intergovern-
mental judicial organ for the resolution of concrete cases” (as opposed,
perhaps, to an international court) tend toward an interpretation of Alek-
seyev II as a shot across the bow of the ECtHR.127
The trajectory of Russia’s collision course with international legal
structures has only picked up speed since the Alekseyev II CCRF ruling.
Russia’s foreign policy increasingly strikes a discordant note against other
states, as demonstrated by the questionable legality of Russia’s involve-
123. Id. § 2.2.  The exact contours of these norms are not well explained by the court.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 3.
126. Id. § 3.2.
127. Id. § 1.3.
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ment in the wars in Ukraine128 and Syria.129 More directly concerning for
the ECtHR, Russia has passed a series of laws further limiting the human
rights of its citizens, including the broad criminalization of “extremism”
(vaguely defined),130 imposing long prison sentences for publicly support-
ing separatist movements within the Russian Federation,131 and the label-
ing of a variety of human rights organizations as “foreign agents”132 or
disbanding them as “undesirable.”133
For its part, the ECtHR has demonstrated increasing toughness
against Russian violations of the treaty, ruling against Russia in a variety
of cases important to the government, including those involving protests
against the election of President Putin134 and the forcible state acquisition
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Yukos oil company.135 In December 2015, the
128. The legal status of Russian involvement in the war in Ukraine is muddled at best,
but President Putin has admitted that some Russian forces are involved: “We’ve never said
there are no people there who deal with certain matters, including in the military area, but
this does not mean that regular Russian troops are present there. Feel the difference.” Vladi-
mir Putin’s annual news conference, KREMLIN.RU (Dec. 17, 2015), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/50971. This is in contrast with President Putin’s response to the same journal-
ist the preceding year concerning the presence of Russian soldiers in Ukraine: “All those who
are following their heart and are fulfilling their duty by voluntarily taking part in hostilities,
including in southeast Ukraine, are not mercenaries, since they are not paid for what they
do.” News conference of Vladimir Putin, KREMLIN.RU (Dec. 18, 2014), http://en.kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/47250.
129. UK foreign secretary Phillip Hammond openly accused Russia of deliberately
targeting Syrian non-combatants in bombing raids: “The Russians are deliberately attacking
civilians, and the evidence points to them deliberately attacking schools and hospitals and
deliberately targeting rescue workers. . . Rescue workers are no longer marking their vehicles
because they believe they are being targeted deliberately. They also told me hospitals around
Aleppo and Idlib have had Red Cross symbols removed because they are becoming a target
for the Russians.” Patrick Wintour, Russia accused of deliberately targeting civilians in Syria,
THEGUARDIAN.COM (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jan/15/russia-
accused-of-breaching-norms-of-war-by-targeting-civilians-in-syria.
130. UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code], art. 280,
http://www.ugolkod.ru/statya-280. For analysis of the government’s use of the extremism law,
see, e.g. Maria Kravchenko, Inappropriate Use of Anti-Extremist Legislation from January
2014 through August 2015, in Brief, SOVA CENTER FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS, (10
Sept. 2015), http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2015/09/d32768/.
131. UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code], art.
280.1, http://www.ugolkod.ru/statya-280-1. For the description of one conviction for posting a
sarcastic comment, see Tanya Lokshina, Dispatches: The Crime of Speaking Up in Russia,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/22/dispatches-
crime-speaking-russia.
132. For a critical analysis of the law, including a list of organizations included as of
December 9, 2015, see Russia: Government against Rights Groups, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-
chronicle.
133. The “undesirable organizations” law has been used to disband several organiza-
tions and to induce several others to cease operations in Russia. See Russia: Open Society
Foundation Banned, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/
12/01/russia-open-society-foundation-banned.
134. Frumkin v. Russia, App. No. 74568/12.
135. Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04.
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Russian government passed the doctrine of the CCRF’s right to review
ECtHR rulings for constitutionality into Russian law, perhaps in response
to these rulings.136
The argument could be made that the law only asserts the familiar
notion of a dualist conception of international law, but given the structure
of the Russian Constitution, the argument falls flat. The ECHR has a
uniquely powerful effect, both politically and doctrinally, and the Russian
legal system is unusually open to international law (at least on paper),
making serious legal argumentation in opposition to the ECtHR a difficult
task.
5. The Cost of Conflict
Taken together, the state of Russian law, the current doctrine of the
CCRF, and the particulars of the 2013 law all seem to be directly opposed
to the ECHR system. But the costs of the Russian government’s affront to
the ECHR system do not fall solely on the ECtHR. If Russia refuses to
change the law, it is left with two uncomfortable alternatives: a clear break
with ECtHR’s rulings (either denunciation of the treaty under Article 58
or an open statement that Russia will not recognize ECtHR rulings), or
persisting in a long practice of selective non-compliance that will erode its
ability to fully participate in the Council of Europe.
Officials in the Russian government are well aware of this dilemma
and appear to be willing to engage in threats of withdrawal, at least rhetor-
ically. With tensions high over the war in Ukraine, the voting rights of the
Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope (PACE) were suspended starting in April 2014, leading to a Russian
boycott until the end of 2015, maybe longer.137 In January 2015, the
Speaker of the State Duma, Sergei Naryshkin, floated the idea of with-
drawing from the Council of Europe by the end of the 2015.138 While Rus-
sia has yet to follow through with the threat, a withdrawal from the
Council of Europe would also imply a withdrawal from the ECHR system,
with all the costs that withdrawal necessarily entails: political isolation
from international neighbors, a loss of influence over the European deci-
136. “The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation may . . . decide a question
concerning the possibility of fulfilling a decision of an intergovernmental organ for the pro-
tection of human rights and freedoms without carrying out a hearing, if it comes to the con-
clusion that the question may be decided on the basis of the contents of rights rulings in
previously accepted rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and the
carrying out of a hearing is not indispensable for the fulfilment of the rights of the parties.”
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi konstitutsionnyi zakon “O Kon-
stitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [Federal law of the Russian Federation on the
amendment of Federal constitutional law “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Feder-
ation”], ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] December 14, 2015, art. 1, ¶ 3, http://www.rg.ru/
2015/12/15/ks-site-dok.html.
137. Ukraine Conflict: Russia Boycotts Europe Rights Body PACE, BBC (Jan. 28,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31032034.
138. Naryshkin: Russia May Raise the Question of its Council of Europe Membership,
TASS (Jan. 21, 2015, 11:54 PM), http://tass.ru/en/russia/772588.
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sion-making process, possibly decreased trade relations, and a confirma-
tion of Russia’s status as a pariah in international law.
The Russian government has shown that it is willing to test the inter-
national order where it conflicts with its interests and, in the case of the
annexation of Crimea, openly defy international law. Far-seeing political
calculus on the part of the Russian government would suggest that the
costs of non-participation in the Council of Europe and the ECHR would
be heavy, leaving Russia not only isolated politically but also removing an
important tool in protecting Russian interests in Europe. However, Rus-
sia’s exit from the system cannot be ruled out, given recent events and its
increasingly erratic relationship with international legal norms.
Even in the event that Russia is truly committed to a path of self-
isolation and the breaking of its international obligations, any moves to
delay that break by diluting the strength of ECtHR doctrine on LGBT
rights (or any other subject) would seem to incur all costs and no benefits
for the ECHR system. Any attempt on the part of the ECtHR to provide
Russia with a margin of appreciation on issues like LGBTQ rights would
only legitimize a deliberately bad-faith gesture on the part of Russian leg-
islation. Given Russia’s defiant tone, it seems unlikely Russia will reward
leniency from the ECtHR with compliance. On the contrary, Russia might
feel emboldened and heap provocation upon provocation against a weak-
ened ECHR system either as a means of justifying its secession from the
treaty, or else to undermine efforts directed toward European integration
and the development of human rights law.
Worse, Russian defiance of the ECtHR might intensify a worrying
trend among the ECHR member states, some of whom are increasingly
drifting away from human rights protection. In Hungary, the rise of Viktor
Orbán’s Fidesz Party has led to a series of reforms that Orbán describes as
part of “illiberal democracy,”139 including a dramatic restructuring of elec-
tion law and the consolidation of the media into the hands of people loyal
to Fidesz.140 In Turkey, the moves of President Erdogan to exert greater
control over the media have raised protests from the European Union,
and he openly declared that after the 2015 elections, he hoped to com-
mand a majority great enough to dramatically increase the constitutional
powers of the President—likely at the expense of his political oppo-
139. For a declaration of Orbán’s definition of illiberal democracy, see Prime Minister




140. See, e.g., Disrespect for European Values in Hungary, 2010-2014, HUNGARIAN HEL-
SINKI COMMITTEE, (Nov. 21, 2014), http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Disrespect_for_val
ues-Nov2014.pdf. See also Hungary: Constitutional Change Falls Short–Europe Should Act on
Its Rule of Law Concerns, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/18/
hungary-constitutional-change-falls-short.
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nents.141 Although the leaders of other member states may have stronger
ties and public opinion in favor of European cooperation, states that
would like to avoid human rights obligations might find it attractive to
exploit a Russian crack in the treaty regime to ignore more of their ECHR
obligations. Drawing out the conflict therefore does not benefit the
ECtHR, which should prepare itself to engage the 2013 law (and other
violations of the ECHR) directly and swiftly.
In response to the 2013 law, the ECtHR need do nothing beyond the
obvious: apply its Article 11 and non-discrimination jurisprudence to Arti-
cle 10 and remind Russia that its ECHR obligations apply. While other
issues and other cases may also demand the Court’s attention, the 2013
law presents unique significance, with its roots in a signature European
rights issue and stemming from a law apparently designed to challenge the
ECHR. At this stage, the Court cannot sidestep the 2013 law even if it
wanted to.
Additionally, there might be a silver lining if Russia were to decide to
withdraw from the ECHR: such an unusual event would both prove why
reforms to the ECHR are so valuable and remove a major obstacle to
those reforms. While Russia is inescapably part of Europe—whether or
not either Europe or Russia likes to admit it—Russia has also often played
spoiler to ECtHR reforms.142 If Russia were to leave the ECHR, either
permanently or temporarily, it might be possible to finally resolve long-
standing issues regarding caseloads, enforcement of compliance, and
Court composition.
Ultimately, while there may be nothing that the ECtHR can do to
force Russia’s compliance, the logical extension of the Court’s jurispru-
dence on LGBT assembly rights to expression represents the best path
forward. If the Court does move resolutely against the 2013 law, as it
should, it will demonstrate confidence not so much in its own strength
over the Russian Federation, but in the necessity of their relationship.
IV. MOVING FORWARD WITH CONFIDENCE: MEDIATING BETWEEN THE
ECHR AND MEMBER STATES THROUGH SYSTEMS PLURALISM
The ECtHR carries a special responsibility to resist the severe limita-
tion of the freedom of expression in Russia and to protect LGBT Russians
from being sacrificed in the government’s bids to impose greater control
over society. If the Court decides to stand its ground, it would require
Russian courts to uphold the non-discrimination and expression rights of
Russian citizens. With Alekseyev II already on its way to the ECtHR, it is
141. See, e.g., Erdogan tells Europe to stop criticizing Turkey, REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2014,
10:56 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/26/us-turkey-erdogan-idUSKBN0K40U
720141226.
142. Nussberger, supra note 59, at 607 (outlining the way Russia has refused to ratify
several Additional Protocols to the ECHR). See also supra note 12 and accompanying text,
demonstrating the difference in dates of ratification between Russia and other Member
States.
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important that the ECtHR seize the opportunity to strengthen its protec-
tions of LGBT Europeans and of expression generally.
This opportunity requires a careful understanding of the somewhat
paradoxical sources of the ECHR’s authority. On the one hand, the CCRF
observations in Alekseyev II about the limitations of the ECtHR are not
entirely unfounded in the treaty text itself, particularly in relation to possi-
ble interference with national legal processes. Both the exhaustion re-
quirement143 and the Court’s inability to independently enforce its
rulings144 demonstrate that the ECHR is not designed to operate entirely
independently but rather hand-in-hand with national legal systems. In ad-
dition, the ECtHR is primarily authorized to address individual cases and
not to overrule statutes: even in the case of pilot judgments, the Court
seems to assert an administrative duty to lower its caseload rather than a
doctrinal right to control national law.145
At the same time, the ECHR treaty does seem designed to provide
corrective rulings to wayward state courts, suggesting at least some form of
superiority or independence. The ECHR treaty claims in itself the author-
ity to define the human rights it includes without explicit reference to state
definitions of those rights.146 When the ECtHR employs techniques like
the margin of appreciation to give states space to maneuver, it can be ar-
gued that it does so of its own accord and not out of necessity. This argu-
ment can be bolstered by the vagueness about the operation and source of
the margin of appreciation. In these ways, the ECtHR seems to operate as
a constitutional court might, deriving its authority not solely as temporary
grant at the consent of state sovereignty by way of a treaty, but as a court
endowed with its own authority.
In support of the proposition that the ECHR should be understood to
act autonomously, Alec Stone Sweet argues that the treaty can be under-
stood at least loosely as a constitutional system based on its structure, its
behavior as a court, and its relationship to member states. In the first
place, the ECtHR protects fundamental rights (traditionally a constitu-
tional domain). It does so through authoritative interpretation of the
ECHR through a sustained (and growing) caseload and a “minimally ro-
bust conception of precedent.”147 Additionally, the ECtHR employs pro-
portionality to interpret the ECHR, which is “a global constitutional
standard” for evaluating rights.148 Stone Sweet argues elsewhere that the
development of pilot judgments amounts to the assertion that the ECtHR
can make generally-applicable rulings instead of deciding only individual
143. ECHR, supra note 26, art. 35.
144. The treaty has no enforcement mechanisms beyond the commitment of member
states to “undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are
parties.” ECHR, supra note 26, art. 46.
145. See The Pilot Judgment Procedure ¶¶ 1, 6, 9, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Pilot_judgment_procedure_ENG.pdf.
146. ECHR, supra note 26, art. 32.
147. Stone Sweet, supra note 95, at 2-3.
148. Id. at 5.
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petitions.149 In other words, the ECtHR might be considered a constitu-
tional court because it does what constitutional courts do.
The ECHR might also be considered constitutional in its interaction
with member states, particularly through state incorporation of ECtHR
rulings. Stone Sweet notes that many states which lacked judicially en-
forceable charters of rights—including France, the UK, and the Nether-
lands, among others—have incorporated the ECHR into their legal
systems to fill “certain ‘gaps’ in the national constitution, enabling the
[state] courts to review the lawmaking of all public authorities, including
Parliaments, for their conformity with Convention rights.”150 Some states,
like the Netherlands, explicitly give ECtHR rulings direct effect, and with
the serious exceptions outlined in this note, member states do not gener-
ally challenge the applicability of the ECHR to their law with serious
force, suggesting a strong binding authority in the body. Although the de-
gree of incorporation varies from state to state, and although the ECtHR
lacks the authority to force a state to change its internal law, the weight
and effectiveness of the ECtHR may be seen as sufficiently binding on
member states to be in some degree constitutional.
The argument about the “constitutional” nature of the Court has en-
gendered a great deal of legal controversy, as it implies both broad powers
for the ECtHR and additional limitations on state sovereignty. Although
prominent members of the Court argued in favor of a constitutional inter-
pretation of the ECHR, that point was not settled. In discussions concern-
ing the reformation of the ECtHR, debates about the constitutional
character of the Court were possibly part of the reason why Protocol 14
was so hard won.151
Critics of the idea of constitutional courts outside of sovereign states
might object that the ECtHR lacks the features necessary to claim any sort
of binding constitutionality. Dieter Grimm, for example, demands both
that a constitution be representative of a specific people and that it assert
pure primacy in and of itself152—two features the ECtHR lacks. For these
reasons, perhaps, Alekseyev II describes the ECtHR as a “subsidiary” and
“intergovernmental” quasi-judicial “organ” as opposed to a court, let
alone a court that can bind the CCRF.153 Without the attachment to a
national constitution with sovereign powers, the argument goes, a court
149. Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal
Orders, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS 3, 11 (Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller eds., 2008).
150. Stone Sweet, supra note 95, at 8.
151. Resistance to initiatives to expand ECtHR authority to a generally binding rulings,
sometimes justified by proponents as extensions of its “constitutional mission” as opposed to
providing individual remedies, required careful negotiation among the member states. See
ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 500-02
(2010).
152. Dieter Grimm, The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a
Changed World, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 3, 9 (Petra Dobner & Martin
Loughlin eds., 2010).
153. Alekseyev II, § 1.3.
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like the ECtHR cannot exercise anything approximating binding constitu-
tional powers.
Traditional constitutional theory presupposes that a constitutional re-
gime precludes all other sources of sovereign authority, and that the con-
stitution source from which all legal authority derives, but in the modern
international legal order, it seems clear that states do not exercise all legal
authority. From the UN Security Council to the International Criminal
Court to the complex structures of the European Union, a variety of inter-
national organs exercise what appears to be binding, permanent legal au-
thority. While conceptually the authority of these international organs
might be argued to derive from their member states, in practice, member
states are unable to withdraw their authority from most of these systems
once it has been granted. Indeed, the very nature of the ECHR presumes
that states can cede some degree of authority over rights interpretation to
an international court. If in practice the sovereign powers characteristic of
a sovereign state can be permanently absorbed into an international or-
gan, a hard line claiming states are the only source of authority in interna-
tional law becomes difficult to defend: questions of the monistic or
dualistic nature of international law become muddled as both states and
international bodies appear capable of deriving their powers from texts
which claim binding legal authority and exercising that authority
simultaneously.
Constitutional pluralism helps resolve this theoretical difficulty by
describing more accurately the interaction of the ECHR with the legal
systems of member states. Instead of limiting the concept of constitutional
authority as necessarily exclusive, constitutional pluralism claims that mul-
tiple sources can claim independence without fully resolving which claim is
ultimately superior. In this way, member states recognize the ECHR as a
binding treaty deriving its legal strength from their sovereign authority,
while the ECtHR claims that its legal authority derives from the text of
the ECHR now that it has been put into effect.
To the charge that constitutional pluralism is by definition impossible,
because a constitution claims within itself all final legal authority, Stone
Sweet responds that pluralism already exists within state constitutional
systems—for example, in the federal systems of Germany and Italy—and
therefore competition between member state courts and the ECtHR
should not be particularly concerning.154 Alternatively, if the assertion of
constitutionality is too much, the powers of the ECHR could be described
as something more like Andreas Vobkuhle’s europäischer Verfassungsger-
ichtsverbund (“multi-level cooperation of the European constitutional
courts”),155 which avoids the use of the word “constitution” while describ-
ing a situation where there are multiple claims of independent and binding
legal power. In a similar way, even when it dislikes the rulings of the
154. Stone Sweet, supra note 95, at 10-12 (describing “pluralist,” or at least unconsoli-
dated, constitutional adjudication systems in Spain, Germany, Italy, and France).
155. Andreas Vobkuhle, Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts,
6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 175, 183-86 (2010).
224 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:191
ECtHR, Russia is forced into the difficult position of defending its own
sovereign authority while somehow conforming to the judgments of the
ECtHR. Competing claims of final authority between the Russian Consti-
tution and the ECHR, along with an inability to evade the legal rulings of
the ECtHR, explains why a ruling like the Markin CCRF decision was
necessary for the Constitutional Court in the first place. Whatever the ori-
gin of the ECHR’s authority, the binding power of ECtHR rulings on Rus-
sian courts suggests the relationship is more than simply consensual.
A. Systems Pluralism between Russia and the ECHR
The lingering tension between the ECHR and the Russian Constitu-
tion after the Markin decisions and their restatement in statute presents
special problems for the CCRF. If the Constitutional Court insists on its
right to override ECtHR rulings, the courts will be on a collision course
over the 2013 law, among others. Unfortunately, no clear hierarchy
presents itself in order to resolve the conflict: on the one hand, Russia is a
member of the ECHR and is bound by international law to respect its
rulings; on the other hand, the Russian Constitution claims authority in
and of itself to define human and civil rights and vests that power in the
Constitutional Court. The only escape is to openly defy international law,
which decision the Russian Constitution denies.
Thus, the tension between the CCRF and the ECtHR presents an op-
portunity to explore the viability of systems pluralism, where both courts
claim original authority to define human rights, but neither can overpower
the other and therefore must accommodate the other to protect human
rights. Daniel Halberstam has described this type of constitutional plural-
ism as “systems pluralism,” a relationship between legal systems in which
there exists “a true conflict of final legal authority,” mutually embedded
openness in the one to the claim of authority made by the other, the lack
of a “mutually-accepted tie-breaker,” and “a common cause among the
sites of governance.”156
This type of pluralism presumes that because a final hierarchy cannot
be established between certain types of legal systems, constitutions need
not be entirely closed systems in order to be fully authoritative. Instead,
legal systems will interact in non-hierarchical but structurally-compelled
ways that deny the ability to resolve the conflict of authority. For example,
inside the European Union, neither the member states nor EU institutions
can fully control the other, but neither can they truly eliminate the other.
Halberstam describes this situation of reciprocal dependence in the EU as
“mutual embedded openness.”157
Mutual embedded openness can accurately describe the ECHR sys-
tem as well: member states remain generally open to the authority of the
156. Daniel Halberstam, Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional
Law: National, Supranational and Global Governance, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 85, 95 (2012).
157. Id. at 97-99.
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ECHR, inasmuch as they feel the necessity to participate in European in-
tegration. This is especially true as it relates to Russia, where openness
and adherence to international human rights law is required by the consti-
tution and where Russia is a signatory to the ECHR treaty.
1. Acting with Binding Authority through Mutual Embedded
Openness
Regardless of whether the ECtHR is officially recognized as a consti-
tutional court, the case of the 2013 law demonstrates precisely why it
should act like one, at least on certain issues. Currently, each of the factors
of systems pluralism is present in the relationship between the ECHR and
the Russian legal system. Markin and Alekseyev II demonstrate that there
is a true conflict as to where final authority to rule on human rights cases
lies. Russia insists on the final word on the application of ECtHR rulings
by reserving to the CCRF the right to evaluate the constitutionality of any
judgment having legal effect in Russia. For its part, the ECtHR presumes
that Russia is bound to accept its rulings under commonly-accepted rules
of international law, let alone under the Russian Constitution’s special
provisions, and that the ECtHR’s judgments are final.
At the same time, each system is inherently open to the other through
the foundational principles of its own legal system. The Constitutional
Court is bound to heed the ECHR treaty and the Constitution, which priv-
ileges international law. It cannot claim authority in the constitution to
deny the ECHR without undermining its own legal authority. Thus, in the
Markin CCRF decision, the Constitutional Court accepted the ECtHR
judgment but insisted on its own authority to review the rulings, demon-
strating that even though it claims final authority in itself, ECtHR rulings
continue to hold force. The ECtHR, on the other hand, inherently relies
on member states’ legal systems to both produce situations for review and
to enforce its judgments.
At the same time, conflict has only arisen because the ECHR and the
Russian Constitution both claim to be invested in the common project of
protecting the human rights of Russian citizens. The conflict is by design: if
the ECHR was designed to simply supplant constitutional courts on issues
of human rights, the treaty would be designed very differently. The ratifi-
cation of binding international treaties by sovereign states is a process that
inherently presumes multiple claims of final authority—in other words,
the operation of the ECHR is a process that presumes systems pluralism.
The entire conflict around the 2013 law illustrates why this is the case.
Even when the CCRF asserts in Alekseyev II that the ECtHR is a subsidi-
ary body and that only a constitutional court can review the content of
human rights in a national legal system,158 it still makes reference to the
ECHR to define family rights, implicitly empowering the ECtHR as an
interpreting body.159 When it comes to defining politically sensitive rights,
158. See Alekseyev II, §1.3.
159. Id. § 3.
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this process leaves a great deal of uncertainty as to the status of the rela-
tionship between the CCRF and the ECtHR but leaves them tied together
in ways that do not provide room for Russia to ignore the ECtHR with
impunity.
This situation continues, however, only as long as there is no Russian
exit from the ECHR system. In theory, constitutional pluralism requires
lasting conflict between competing constitutional legal systems, where
each system is fundamentally and inevitably tied up in the other. Because
no permanent hierarchy has been established between the ECtHR and the
CCRF, the systems must learn to accommodate each other. Each claims
the authority of final judgment on the meaning of human rights as applied
in Russia. Barring a Russian exit, both systems must interact whether they
like it or not.
Current Russian cases will likely test the durability of Russia’s partici-
pation in the ECHR It is an open question as to whether such a pluralistic
relationship can endure the level of conflict currently presented between
Russia and the ECtHR, or whether systems pluralism is simply a transi-
tional process from one hierarchy to another. The latter view would sug-
gest that the current high-energy conflict between the ECtHR and the
Constitutional Court must eventually resolve itself into a more stable sys-
tem through a new hierarchy. It is unclear how that could occur since there
no way for the ECtHR to compel Russian courts to comply with its rul-
ings. However, if conflicts are not resolved, the costs (in both the political
and perhaps the monetary sense, in the case of fines) will continue to
mount until, perhaps, Russia is presented with the choice to either make
an about-face and comply, or be compelled to leave the ECHR system.
At the same time, the ECHR is a system which involves many actors
beyond Russia, and the ECtHR’s relationship with Russia will affect its
relationship with other states. If the ECtHR chooses to appease the Rus-
sian government, it will be sending the signal to the other members of the
ECHR that the pluralist system has entered a state of degradation and
that the balance of power is up for negotiation. If Russia chooses to exit
the ECHR system when presented with the costs of continued resistance,
the relationship with other members of the system will also be tested. The
degree of binding authority it would continue to exercise after a Russian
exit would not necessarily be absolute—it would be clear that states can
escape its authority by leaving the treaty—but for those states who see no
choice but to stick with the ECHR, it would operate as if it were absolute.
It is therefore important that the Court therefore send the right message:
member states accepted a pluralist relationship on human rights and can-
not with impunity choose when to heed the ECtHR and when to ignore it.
While the exit of one contentious partner might prove that the ECHR
is not an entirely permanent system, it might also provide an opportunity
to improve it. Some of the incentives which hold the rest of the ECHR
together do not apply to Russia, including EU membership and greater
business ties. Therefore, a show of strength on the part of the ECtHR in
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confronting the 2013 Russian law can demonstrate the seriousness of the
Court’s jurisprudence on human rights.
The particulars of the case of the 2013 Russian law bolster the argu-
ment for the binding (or even constitutional) status of the ECHR and
demonstrate the opportunity for the ECtHR to move assertively. Even if
arguments about the fully constitutional nature of the ECHR are set aside,
the specific provisions of the Russian Constitution, particularly Article 15,
grant international law and human rights law privileged status and demon-
strate one instance where its rulings take on the characteristics of systems
pluralism. Thus, whether the ECHR is seen either as having been granted
a special constitutional status by the Russian Constitution, or whether it is
exercising a type of finally-binding authority from its inherent nature as a
human rights document, it should move with confidence in asserting its
interpretation of the inherent rights of Russians to speak in public con-
cerning homosexual relationships.
CONCLUSION
The direction the ECHR has taken in its LGBT jurisprudence is une-
quivocal and irreversible. Equally clear is that Russia means to challenge
the ECtHR’s resolve with its 2013 law outlawing “propaganda” about
“non-traditional sexual relationships.” Given that conflict is unavoidable,
the question is what happens next. The custom and text of the ECHR
gives the ECtHR great authority, and the Russian Constitution ties the
hands of Russian courts by proscribing the evasion of international law,
statutory rules and contrary judicial opinions notwithstanding. The alter-
native is to degrade the Russian Constitution as the final binding authority
of the legal system.
While the ECtHR cannot force the CCRF to follow the protections its
own constitution provides, nor can it require the enforcement of ECHR
rights, the ECtHR’s almost inevitable ruling against the 2013 law (and
others in conflict with the ECHR) will create heavy pressure for the
CCRF to comply. This kind of pressure might encourage the government
to change course on the law rather than endure the legal and geopolitical
consequences of a strong ruling from the ECtHR, but it will surely demon-
strate the strength of the ECHR system. At the same time, other member
states will understand that the Court considers itself a partner in defining
European human rights, not a subordinate of state courts. Anything less
would seem to vindicate Russia’s stand against European values.
Particularly when Russia seems determined to continue to play spoiler
to the ECHR system, any attempt to mollify Russia is a proposition with
no benefits. On the other hand, the principled defense of ECHR rights in
opposition to the 2013 Russian law provides major benefits. For Russian
citizens, this would provide substantial protection in precisely the way the
Russian constitution intended: by ensuring the international system will
act when domestic political will is lacking. In terms of the ECHR system, a
strong follow-up to the ECtHR’s Article 11 jurisprudence would
strengthen both the development of LGBT rights in Europe and provide a
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principled defense of the freedom of expression. Finally, ruling against the
2013 law would reinforce the strength of the Court’s rulings among mem-
ber states and reinforce the principle of mutually embedded openness
among all the members of the ECHR system. While there are risks to any
action, it seems clear that recognizing the 2013 law for what it is—a bra-
zenly egregious violation of the ECHR—is the best path to a strong and
vibrant human rights system in Europe.
